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Africa is ern uneqnal partner in the globalisetl vr,orlr-1. L)espite the neoliberal
claims that globalisation pr11r1,i6les eqlr.rl opportunities for growth and
devekrpment to ali prl;1ys15 in thc global capitalist ;rrena, all indices of growth
and developrrncnt in relatitrn to Africa are in the nc;ative lr,hich signify that
globalis.rtion has led to retrogrc.ssion rather than progress. The dilemma of
Africa's develr.lprmgnt is in svnc 
"r,ith, 
and indeed jr-rstifies, the seeming
snsprcion and criticisms of the de;renden., theorisation of Third World
scholarship. No dor-rbt, the n.rture of Africa's incorporation :into the global
c.,rpitalist system contributed to its peripheral status, but that explanatory
moclel does not satisfactorilv subsist in explaining its continued entrapment
in r.rnderdevelop-rment given its abundant human and natr-rral eudowments.
The culpability for Africa's underdevelopment does not only reside in the
mechanisms of its integration into global capitalism but extends to the
postcolonial conduct of st.rte affairs by its ruling elite. This paper examines
the contemprorary atlas of Africa's socio-economic formation vis-)-vis the
index of failed states .rncl argues that there is urgent need for a model of
der.'elr-rpment outside the precinct of Ettro-American orthodoxy of
globalisation i.rs presently constituted.
Introduction
Globalisation denotes seamless integration of the world in such a way
that national barriers are lowered for r-rnfettered movement of capital,
goods and pcople. There is no doubt that the forces of globalisation
have moved the world to greater prosperity. But the major challenge is
the persistr:r-it inequality and distril-ruiional injustice associ;rtet1 with it.
As UNCTAD observes, "economic integration and interdependcnce iu
the world today have reacl'red an r-rnprecedented level. As a result, the
globarlizecl economy cannot function for the benefit of all withotrt
internertional solidaritv and cooperation".lThat is exactly what is Irot
lrappening. Clotralisartion functions for the developerd cc'runtries.
Althor-rgh African economies grew from 5.3 to 5.8 pcrcerlt in 2007, this
gror,vth was as a rcsult of tremendous demand for, anrl hir:h price of
crr.rde. oil and mir-rerais. Similarly, foreign direct investmt'nt ([rDl) l'lows
to Airic;r, thoLrgh on the increase irr recent years, are still too limited in
geograpiric;rl sprend and nilrrowly focused ol1 extrilctivo intltrstries that
)
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their effects on employment creation and poverty alleviation are not
particu larly significant.2
caps between developed and developing countries, as werl as
within the latter, are widening steadily. For instance, the poorest 49
countries, which make up 10 percent of the world,s ptpulation
a_ccounted for only 0.4 percent of world trade in 1996. In 796s', average
cNP per capita for the top 20 per cent of the world,s population was 30
times that of the poores^t_]0 per cent;25 years rater, i., tsso, the gap had
doubled - to 60 times.3 This disparity is growing. Its effects o."Ai.l.u.,states are many and include: the erosion of their economic and political
rndependence; failure_to meet their obligations to its citizenry; internal
instability and conflicts and inability to meet the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).
what is required to make globalisation have a human face is to fill
the valleys and level the mountains of inequality inherent in the global
capitalist system as well as dismantle the hypocritically sellctive
application of Keynesianism and neoliberalism by aerretoped countries
while insisting that African economies shoul,c strictlv follow the
neoliberal path. Progressive redressing of the biases of globalisation
remains an important challenge for the whole intemationafcommunity.
The Foundation and Orthodoxies of Globalisation
clobalisation is ascribed with multi-functionality in terms of its
effects on development. Its many interpretations are based on differences
rn theoretical orientations. Not_only is its origin contested, its trajectory
and effects are also subjects of varying disputations. The meaning of
globalisation, therefore, is encapsulated in multi-layer explications thatare not amenable to a straightforward, - open and close
conceptualisation. Most scholars believe that if there is a contemporary
concept within the confines of the social sciences, which lacks coro".rr.,,
regarding its signification, effects, and analytical implications, it must
certainly be globalisationa. But scholars have, neveitheless, grappled
with the concept from both historical and theoretical perspec"tirres arrd
established seemingly certain boundaries, effects u.,d -u.rif"rtations.
i. Hist oricising Gl ob ali s ati o n
At the historical level, globalisation is believed to have a long history.
119""9, its history coincides with the rise of capitalism. some e"ven tookit further back into history and situated its origin at the early epoch of
man's civilisation. They argued that:
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Globalisation in its most ceneric and broadest sense is part of 
the
movement of historv in general' Throughor-rt l'ristory people have
moved from krod-deficiito food srtr;'ltts reilitrns trking with them
their familic's and flocks, sometitrie:; concluering the are'rs tti 
rvh tch
they movecl' sometimes eettir'g absorlrcd in them and losin5;
their separate identities Ti-'irt laig"r trtovcment of history is the
movemlnt of civiiization itsclf ''
The movement of civilisation is not necessarilY globalisation'
Globalisation is coterminor-rs with state system' Globalisation exists
where state boundaries exist, no matter their inchoateness. Therefore,
the invocation of globalisation in a pre-state systenL is not only
,rp".nro.,, but obfiscates w,hat giobalisation stenrls [or. For disr:ourse
oJgtoUutlrution to be analvtic;rtr1y fmittul', lwo kt'r- clemetrts n-rust 
bc
prelent, one, there must be i state s,istei:-,, wltcthel [r.rlly itlrrrreci or in the
;;;;t; orueing formed; and two, there mustbe drivers of 
globalisation'
such as advances in science and technology, means of payment 
for
goodsandservices/meansoftransportationandmechanismscrftrade.
Essentially, the ultimate goal of globalisation is to pull dowrr state-
erected birriers a.,d contiact the globe in a seamless continuum 
of
i.rt".a"p""aence. This goal of contracting the globe is not-an.end 
in
itself but a means to the advancement of broad ends' which span
financial, economic, social, political and cultural spheres'
The historical origin of^globalisation is therefore locatabie in the
riseofcapitalism,its"intern-ationalisationandvariousexpansionist
campaigns to conquer new grounds' In specific terms' the seed of
co.,temio.ory internationalisition is embedded in such epochal events
u, ,n" "-"rgl.,ce 
of capitalism in Europe in the late Middle Ages; the
new scientilic and cultural thinking embodied in the Renaissance; 
the
establishmentofthegreatEuropeannationsandtheirempires;tlrt:rise
of industrial revoluti[n and the embarkation on voyages of 4iscovery'"
O"spit" the lack of unanimity among scholars concerning the
pJLJirution of the march and manifestation of globalisation, thert' 
is
howeveranagreementthatglobalisatiorrhasmtrtatedfromitseirrlier




The first phase encompassed the Christian Crusades and the
Voyages of Diicovery, Whil; the Chris.tian Crusaders embarked on the
twin t'asks of civilisaiional and cultural revivalism in the face of 
Islamic
"*fur,rior-,irm 
and the dislodgement of Islam and plantation of
Christianity,theVoyagesofDiscovervexpandedthetradeadvantages
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.l IrtrrrPt'lrv st'izi'g tr:rde routes a.d plundering the Amerindian rnines.
irrrtl A lrit',,r p()pLlltrtion. The cnslaveme.t of Airicans hi.rd f;rr-reachins
irrPlil .111,,,,... the continent's development tra.jectorv: while Africa,s
t irP.rcily kr clevelop was circumscribed and weake.ed on,lccount of thetit'Plt'ti.. of its human reso,rces, that of Europe ancr the US was
crt'rgisccl. This led Eric wilriams to suggest rhai the profits of srave
Iratl. spurred the industrial revorution.r'irris thinking ii not misplaced
or cxilggerated as labour power was the dominant"wealth cre;ltor in
that epcch. These voyages opened up the gtobe and generated a t.ur_rrf".,f technology, plants, animars and diseaies on an enormolis scale th.t
there was a world trade boom after 1492.s
The second phase consisted of the scientific age and the industriar
revolution. This epoch was the watershed in the erlolution of the world
economy as it incorporated new thinking in dealing with human
problems. Thb rise of the industrial revorution and theilisma^tring of
the mercantilist barriers marked the beginning of modem globalisation.
The far-reaching changes in the system of froduction L u result of
advances in science and technologvbrought about major 
".o.rorr-ri. 
r,-rd
social transformations. These transformitions not only conferred on
England the global leadership roie but arso drove the revorution in
banking, commerce, transportirion as well as politics which dismantled
reyaf s-tructures in preferences for state systems.e The new momentum
which the industrial revolution engendeied created enormous wealth
that needed reinvestment. withoutiuch reinvestment, capitarism stood
ll" :r-rk of atrophyinq Tl" catching up by Cermurly, f.o.,.", n"igiu_,
the united States and other European countries created new tensions
that were resolved by imperialism and colonialism.
The third phase coincided with the er.r of capitalist imperiarism.
lfe gyormous capital and goods which the improved production anddistribution system threw up required new markets. The need for
expansion was necessitated by the imperative of capitalist survival.
And that survival was anchored on the exportation a^d investment of
capital in undeveloped economies. I. order?or capltal to generate greater
profits and reduce risks, the new bourgeoisie moved"r*oy frJm the
model of pure and competitive small-scile capitalism to industriar and
banking monopolies, cartels, buying and seiling svndicates; notai,-,g
companies, mergers and association.r0 The new processes of monopolv
led to the dismantling of barriers, enthronement of liberalisation ancl
movement towards globarisation through the integratior-r oi internatio.al
commodity markets. Howe'er, globaiisation fe1"l apart after r9i3 as aresult of 
_r-rnhealthy rivalry amongst the European conntries for thec.ntrol of markets and ascende.cy of nati.nar mtnopories., The .iuar.y
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degenerated to wars and ior 30 years globalisatiou rvas cut short until
after tire Second World War.
ThefourthphaservastheperiodaftertheSecondWorldWarto
1973. After the Second World War, there was a ne\'v impulse toward
global integration. This impulse was underpinned by:
a major effort to develop international instittrtions for financial
and trade cooperation and b1' a significant expansion of trade in
manufactltres among indr-rstrial cottntries' It was also
characterized by wiclely varying models of ecorromic
organization ancl limitations on the mobility of capital and
labottr.rr
TheconditionsforthetrajectoryofglobalisationweresetbytheUS
on account of its acquired economic ascendancy over imperial Europe
that suffered *u. ur-rd waS recovering from serious economic reversals
fromthetwoWorldWars'TheUSanchoreditspushforanopen-door
policyintheinternationalpoliticaleconomyonthreenewpolicypillars,
,,urrr"ty' the principle of non-discrimination in trade and investment
outlets; the principle of free convertibility of currencies based on the
.,"* US goia doitu. standard; and the creation of a multilateral
instihrtional framework to supervise and regulate the new system. These
principles engendered the Bretton woods agreements that were adopted
\n tg+S ur-,d th" establishment of multilateral institutions of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (lBIdD), or the World Bank'13 These
multilateral institutions served two interrelated purposes: they
transformed the whole international environment into a truly
internationalsystemofeconomicandpoliticalreiationshipsand
facilitated the opening up of the world to the US transnational
corporations (TNCs).
The logic of this period also motorised the obtainment of self-rule
by most oflhe cour-rtiies that were hitherto under colonial rule. lt has
bL"^ rrgg"rted that it was not simply the forces of globalisation that
secu.ed"s"elf-rule for the colonised peoples around the world but a
confluence of other contending factors. It runs against reason that
globalisation whose cardinal aim is the removal of barriers irnposed by
ihe state system would champion self-rule th;rt would create strong
states. The notion of self-rule, by its very nature' flies in the face of
globalisation as its corollary, independence and territorial sovereignty'
ire antithetical to a seamless access to markets. In actuality, it was the
Russiandemandforself-determinationforthecolonialpeoplesand
6 Nc ticttto,l Deueloprnerft Studies, Number G
their richt to statehoocl that precipitated actions towards their
realisa tior.r.rr
The iifth phase of globalisation cor.rld be prg1is61.ed from 1973
onwards and w;rs not only marked bv the consolidation of
multilateralism but also globalisation. Despite the stride of globalisation
in terms of frcc trade, ubiqr-rity of TNCs and integration of production
systerns, the expansion and mobilitv of capital and the standardisation
of development models under the auspices of the lnternational Financial
Institutions (lFIs), its movement was dogged by three types of
contradictions: the persistence of state interventionist approach; the
persistence of state barriers and restrictions on labour mobility and the
erection of protectionist high walls.
Two developments impacted on, and dictated, the trajectorv of
globalisation: one was the Washington Consensus of Reagan-Thatcher
era; and the other was the collapse'of the Soviet Union. The Washington
Consensus was basically driven by anti-Keynesian policies targeted
against state intervention in national economies. The Consensus
dispensed with the post-war Keynesian economic policy and embraced
the neoliberal economics of the Chicago monetarist school of Milton
Friedman, which unlike Keynesianism explains depression in
capitalism as due to the quantity of money, state intervention and
government errors or those of its agents.15 It predicated its strategies for
economic resuscitation on deregulation of the economies; privatisation
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the downsizing of the state. The
economic crisis that enveloped most of the Third World countries
undermined their negotiating capacity. In fact the institutionalisation
of the principles of the Consensus emboldened the TNCs and leveraged
their penetration of hitherto regulated states.
The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the demise of the last bastion
of opposition to the march of capitalism. Before then, communism stood
as a regulating policeman against capitalist expansion. Globalisation
appears to be a self-protective strategy to protect capitalism from being
consumed by its inherent crisis. The capitalist economy is crisis-prone.
Its crises range from short-term to long-term and are characterised by
alternations between prosperity and relative stagnation.r6
ii. The Theoretical Templntes of Globalisatiort
The major contests surrounding globaiisation centre on: its
meaning, viability as a strategy of development and capacity to dispense
the dividends of development equitably. The contests pitch the
neoliberal school against the an ti-globalisatiorr movement comprising
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of the neo-Marxist school' aiterglobalisation 
and sr-rndry groups' At the
."t" "f'"""tiberai 
school is the contention that:
an interdependent world econom)" 
based on free trade'
soecialization' u'-td'ntt'i'-'t"t'-tutio'-luf 
tlivision of labour facilitates
i.rmestic .t.,u*t,,1.i.'.,"n1. ii"*. ,rI g,,,rt-lr, c'tt'i['tl' 'rnd 
technt'logy
increase optimr-rm efficiency 
in rescr'urce allt-'cation 'lrd therefore
transnrit grorvth f;;'th";;t"loped na.tions 
to the less developed
c,tttttrit''' T''td-::.r;'-*"., ''' ''n 
"engine nf .r.\tth" 't: the le's
d e v e I o p cd-ec" 
^ " 
; ;'*; ;: " 1'' i'' i t.': 
t; 
:l' *] ;1,:i lil: l: I",11
m.,rk"is' This is 'i mrrttralli benulrcial
cleveloped "tt,^";';;::; 
l.,u'"i'-t cheauer r'rrv materials and
outlets lor thei r .or,r.o t,r Itti m,r 
nrr [dcttr rej goodt B1catl.e it ]::i
develol'ed *tt'n'"lt.'"' ft"u" -nlo ll"' m't 
rkets' open ing tr'lde w I t n
advancecl "tottt'"-t'"1'tt'U"ii"o"a 
to beneiit them relatively more
than it does th" d;;;i.l;;"i "tut'nt'"ti"'' 
Moreover' since the factors
of pr.duction fl";;;;t;";"i*n' *n*'"'rhev 
1-r"clttce the highest
reward>,.., r"" ol".]lo;';'":;';;'*y wirh ','trrpltts "f 
lab'rttr and
a deficit "r -o"'l"ll''i'l;:';;';; ';il.'*1"n. ''r 
foreign capital that
accelerate growth'r7
From the prism of this tradition' globalisation 
represents the march
of civilisatio^ t" high"; h"ights of 
prosperity ott "q'itubl" 
scale' Thus'
erobarisation is the uesi thin[,o nur" 
nrpp",-ria to humanity' This school
fonceptualises globalisatioi as a 
proc"" of bo'h 'ertical 
and horizontal
integration of the ""tO" 
*cltfa' which-is made possible by human
innovaLion ,"a t"t#oiogit"if togt*tt''' Tn" 
neoliheral I'heory portrays
globalisatio" ", 
th;;;ir-olttio]: road I'o prosperity for 
all states
p rov ided I hcy a re *i' i''r'1lel' ted' The^cond 
i t i ons f o r h tegra tion i ncl ude:
dismantling terntoriar blarriers; 
removing alr barriers on trade'
investment and ;;;;;;"i capital; 
u'-t"d ft"" -*arketisation'
Neoliberarirr^ ..^i"*Jn,nu, giobaiisation 
offers significant
opportuniti"' to' a""'*-"fopir'g tot';tties 
to stimulate economic growth
and develop*""i-trl'o'lfn"u'oua"r 
market access' foreign direct
investment (FDI)' capitat inflows 
and transfer of technology from 
the
rest of the world. rt,'"'y itturtrnte 
thc prosperity which glob.rlisalion 
has
soawned to he indii.i,*a". .r.r.l irrdiccs 
ur, ih" vrtlttt'oI Lr.rdt' (goods
nnd se.'ices) ""d'; ;.,:';""ttft' 





rot stock which itrcreased
from 6'5 percent "f 
*;;i; Gilt' i''t t 9g0 to : i 'B pcrccn t in 2006; the stock
of internatio^rl .ir;;'(pii*rnrity.L-,o,k 
l0ans) as pcrcentage .f wrrld
GDp which ir,o."ui"J].i* .ougi ty 10 rrcrcent 
irr 1980 to 48 percent in
2006; the '-tt'*t'"t 
of minutes spent on c'toss-bt'rder 
tt'lephone calls' on
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per capit.r basis, wrrich i.creasecr trorn 7.3 i. l99r to 2g.g in 2006; arrLl,the n,rrber.l'rilrt'is. w,rkcrs which increased frorn 7g miilio. peopre(2.4 psr-cc'111o1'thc worlrlpoi.Lrlation) in 1965 to St mrtlr;n'fJop," 1:.0pe.cent.f tl.rc worrd pc'rptrration) in 2005.re As positi'e as thesJ i,-,.ti.uto.,are, the prospgrify which they depicted rvere mostly enjoved by theclevelclpccl economics.
.'rhc anti-grobalisation movement refutes the co.tenLion of the
^e'ribe-'rar 
schoor by questioning trre rogic of globarisatio.,. i*," u.,ti_globalisation movcment is a ,,movemeniof m&ements,,, o^ o*.riU*collectiorr of individuals and groups critical of the psljcle, oi"io,_,o,r",i.neoliberalism, or "corpcrate giobalisation". The cor-rtention of anti-gtobalisarion movernent is that rhe poricies ;i;i;;;il;,o}, nuu..
"*1:"lblt:9 global poverry and increaied inequalily. fn" Ji"".ritv ofanti-globalisation movement is mirrored U, it. .o'.,riii;;;;';ii,;
comprise trade unionists, environmentalists, anarchists, lur.,a .igntsand indigenous rights.activists, organiza tions-promoting human rightsand sustainable developTglt, op-"ponents of privatiz#or,, arld a.,ti_sweatshop campaigners. wi thin the academr"r, th" anti-giobaiisa tionmovement coalesce around neo-Marxism. It characte.rrl", 
"fo.ro-i.globalisation as a historical outcome of capitalist expansio.rlsm ir-, *r-richthe few powerfur rich fleece the majority poor and thus widen furtherthe differences in developmerlt, rv"uith, resources and power. Itconceives globalisation a,s a process prope-lled by two .or.,i.uai.to.ymovements of centrifugal and centripetai forces. On the or.re ha.,a, ithas the tendency to fragment, differeniiate and marginatire thore so.irtforces that cannot catch up with the dominant social forces that are rncharge of the capitalist transformation and on the other hand, it createsuniformities throughout the world aimed at maximising returns oncapitaland promoting efficient prodr-rction systems througi innovativetechnological changes.20
There is no doubt that globalisation has brought far-reaching
changes and benefits to the r,iorrd. But the dynamics"or gi.urilrtir^
:.",:hrp:9, to a large extent, by the fact that actors are iot on equalfooting' The asvmm"lll i" their position ancl power rneans that the
P-"-""f]l: they derive difier sr-rbstari ary in" irrdustriarisecr countries,lFIs, World Trade Organisation 1WiOy, TNCs exert the strongesti^fluence, whereas the deveroprng countries wield ress influence r*nar.rgthe an ti-globarisa tion movement io advocate "pa rticipa tory democracy,st'cking to increasepopular control of political and economic life in thel.rcc of increasingly powerful corporatior
lirir.cial instittrtitin'-s, arrd U.s. hegc.m.'y.,,-l^s/ 
Llnaccountable global
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iii. The Or th o do xie s of G lob al is atio tr
The orthodoxies of globalisation are encapsulated in the theoretical
orientation of neoliberalism. The neoliberal theory canvasses iull and
extensive integration with global capitalism based on trade and financial
liberalisation. The natttre of global integration which globalisation
envisages is the type that traverses vertically and horizontally and
manifests in increasing volttme and variety of transnational transactions
in goods and services, international capital flows, human migration
and rapid and widespread diffusion of technology.22
The first orthodoxy of globalisation is that it is an inevitable option
and the only path to economic growth and development. Helleiner posits
that globalisation is the only one possible road to full liberalisation and
integration of world markets and that this path traces the inevitable
and desirable fate of all humankind.23 In fact this orthodoxy was given
life by the IMF and World Bank who anchored their develbpment model
on neoliberal strategy. Michel Camdessus, the then Managing Director
of the IMF captured the indispensability of globalisation as a
"development companion" when he asserted that it "offers considerable
opportunities to accelerate trade and economic progress throughout
the world."2a The second orthodoxy is that globalisation tends to bridge
the inequality in the world system as countries operate on areas of
competitive advantage. The Southeast Asian countries were advanced
as the success story of the globalisation gospel. In order to market
neoliberal development strategy to other developing countries, the IFIs
attributed the rapid economic growth and development of Asia's Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs) to their religious implementation of
the neo-liberal policies of trade liberalisation which facilitated an export-
oriented strategy and financial liberalisation, which encouraged foreign
capital inflows.2s
The third is that the more open or globalised a country, the more it
is likely to benefit from the prosperity unleashed by the forces of
globalisation. The advocates of this mvth contended that as some
countries have embraced globalisation, and experienced significant
income increases, other countries that have rejected globalisation, or
embraced it only tepidly, have fallen behind and that globalisation and
liberalisation of developing countries have resulted in remarkable
upsurge in FDI flows in the 1990s from 25 percent in 7991 to an estimated
42 percent in 1998 compared to 18 percent in 1980.'?6 Most leaders of the
Third World uncritically subscribe to this myth withor-rt taking into
consideration the socio-economic cleavages in the world system and
the attendant inequality. Because these factors were not considered,
Emesto Zedillo, the former President of Mexico, remarked at the plenary
r
t
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sessiorl of the worltl [:t:onornic l-onrm in Davos, Switzerland onJanuary
28,2000 that ir-r cver_V casc whcre a poor nation has significantly
overcome its provcrtv, this has been achievecl while engaging in
procltrction l'or cxporI rn;lrkets and opening itself to the ir-rflux of foreign
goods, invcstn.rcnt, ancl technology."The fourth is thaL the expansion of
world traclc through the elimination or reduction of trade barriers, such
as imprort tarilfs rrot onlv provides a wider variety of goods at lower
prices through imports btrt also provides strong incentives for domestic
ilrdustric's to re'main competitive. And beyond these points, trade
enhanccs rrational competiveness, the development of relevant skills as
well as promotes economic resilience and flexibility. A checklist of the
advantages of greatcr openness has been prepared to include:
stimulation of foreign investment, more sources of employment for the
local workforce, new technologies and higher productivity.
The fifth is that greater openness to financial flows has a positive
impact on the national economy and that neoliberal policies would
resolve problems associated with financial liberalisation or rapid, large,
volatile and destabilising capital flows, thereby laying the foundation
for a fast-growing and stable global economy. In spite of this, severe
economic crisis ravaged the Asian NICs in the late 1990s and clrrrently
ravagcs the industrialised economies, thus raising serious questions
about the fundamental ass,mptions of globalisation. The sixth
orthodoxy of globalisation is that it will lead to the collapse of the nation-
state with attendant neutralisation of the negative divisive tendencies
of ethnicity and other d ivisive cleavages including the bridging of social
inequality in domestic economies.
Globalisation, Economic Dependency and African Development
The structure of African eco.omies throws up contradictions that
are essentially anti-development. Although the nature of their
integration into the global capitalist system is contributory to the
contemporarv challenges of African development, it is not the sole
reason. At independence, African leaders had the opportuniLies to
extricate the continent from the stranglehold of neo-colonialism but
they did not, principally because they saw state power as a tool for
primitive accumulation. The explanation that "the monopolistic
distribr.rtion of power in the global economy makes it extremely difficult
for Africa to break out of economic dependence, [and that] class
contradictions make it difficult for African leaders to get their priorities
righ t ;-rnd to engender the unity of purpose and the effort which is needed
t. tackle the problem of dependence" is not adequate to explain the
t'or r I i rr Lred monoculturalism of African economies, the use of state power
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and resources to build personal fiefdom .rnd the plunder of Africa's
commonwealth by self-acciaimed tin gods and despots'rB The prospects
of development in Africa have remained disrnal and characterised bv
uncertainty. On everv conceivable socio-economic and political
-"orr."*"nt table, African states are alwavs crowded at the bottom.
The African economies are characterised by "primary production, low
share of world trade, low manufactured outptrt and exports,low savings
and investment, dominance of oDA [overscas development aid] and
low private capital inflow, rapid population growth, dominance of
public sector iir-:,-uir weak private sector, l-reavy external debt
burden "ro
An economy r,vith this iitany of peculiar negativities cannot attract,
or be expected to respond to, ordinarv development stimuli' Any
stimulus to be administered must diagnose the peculiarities of its
problem and thereafter customize a package' But,- the reforms
masterminded by the IFIs did not incorporate the peculiarities of the
African economies in their packages, which led to their unqualified
failure. Africa's economic problem started in the 1970s and assumed
crisis proportions by the 1980s. The crisis deepened its structural defects
(characterised by undiversified, monolithic and monocultural
production bases ind dwindling share of global trade) intensified its
institutional distortions (which manifested in weak institutional
capacity for economic policy management and coordination, debt
orrlrhang, macroeconomic policy inconsistency and public sector
dominaice of the economy and corruption); and, exacerbated its
infrastructural inadequacies (such as energy crisis, poor healthcare
system, bad road neLworks and moribund rail system)'30
The rescue mission of African economies was grounded in the
neoliberal theory, which was given essence by the ten policy reforms of
the washington-Consensus. These policy reforms which were projected
as the answers to the development dilemma of third world economies
included: (a) Fiscal policy discipline: to avert large-scale fiscal deficits
relative to GDP; (b) Reordering of public expenditure priorities: as a
mechanism to channel subsides towards broad-based provision of key
pro-growth, pro-Poor services like primary education, primary
i ealthcare and infrastructure investment; (c) Tax reforms: to create a
tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moclerate marginal
tax rates; (d) Liberalisation of interest rates: to make intercst rtrtes market-
driven and positive in order to discourage capit;rl flight and increase
savings; (e) A competitive exchange rate: that will be determined by
ma.kJt forces; (f)Tiade liberalisation: which involves the liberalisation
of imports by dismantling restrictions to free trade; (g) Liberalisation of
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in-ward forcigr-r c'lirect irrvcstnrent (FDI): in order to attract foreign capiiai,
skills and technological knowledge necessary to boost the*domestic
economy or contribrrtc to new exports; (h)privatization of state-owned
enterprises: in orclcr to dislodge tlre state from the commanding heights
of the econorlv and replace it with the private sector; (i) Deregulation: A
stratcgy Io prornote competition through the abolition of barriers that
impcdc cntrv of new firms or restrict tl-reir exist; and, (j) property rights:
to providc the informal sector with ability to gain p.op"ity iights at
acceptable costs.3l
Essentially, washington ConsensLls represents the paradigmatic
shif t from the rigidities of state intervention slrnbolised by keyneslanism
towards free market policies. This new shift achieved'in the Reagan-
Thatcher era from tizs-lsss was designed as an offensive towards
global economic growth and development through seamless integration.
The generhl reaction of African leaders to globalisation was unlcritical
acceptance. They believed that globalisation provided the magical Midas
touch for development. The New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) was modelled tobe compatible with the poricyprescriptions
encapsulated in the washington Consensus. The NEpAD initiative was
conceived and developed by African leaders as a roadmap for
accelerated economic growth and sustainable development in ttre
globalisation process. But Africa has not reaped the toufed benefits of
globalisation despite its immersion, since the 19g0s, into the waters of
neoliberal reforms. In fact, globalisation has yielded contradictory
results.
Globalisation and Failed State Syndrome: Any Connection?
The development challenges facing Africa are enormous. African
states are still grappling with the fundamentals of basic sustenance.
since they were sucked into the epicentre of the econornic crisis in the
late 1970s, most Airican countries have been lying prostrate in that
condition. All the doses of neoliberal theoretical pills that were injected
into them ranging from stabilisation policy measures, ausierity
measlrres, sAP, PRSI'] and a host of others, faiied to resuscitate them
despite the promises made by the IFis and the sacrifices made by the
people. The seeming inefficiency of these reforms in the face of tt 
"intractability of the economic malaise led the then Nligeria,s military
Ilead of State, General Ibrahim Babangida (19g5-1993) to wonder
cxasperatingly why the Nigerian economy had neither collapsed nor
rt'covered.
At the advent of globalisation, the condition given to Africa to
[,irrt.rke in its boundless prosperity was to swallow the policy
l,-ailerl State Syndrcnne and Ecortomic Depertdertcy itt AfriL:a ll
prescrlptions of tlre W;-rshington Consenstts in varving doses. African
Ieal1ers subscribed to these prornises and thtts, religior-rslv dismantled
their trade barricrs ar-rcl opened up their econornies for tracle and FI)1.
Tl-rev also rolled back the government through the privatisation of SOEs
irnd the commercialisation of social services. The failure of the reform
programmes to resctle African economies and the ;rloofness of the
globalisation to equitably distribute its prosperitv trnderpin tl-re various
rnanifestations of state failr"rre in Africa.
Although the concept of failed state is enshrouded in dispr-rtations
because of its definitional impreciseness, certain basic facts are conveyed
when the terrn is r-rsed. State failure pictures the disconnect between
people's expectations and the reality of state's incapacity to meet such
cxpectations. A state is a success or failure within the cofrtext of meetinp;
the fundamental objectives of statehood either speciiically defined by it
or generally defined. The state exists as ;rn organising, regulatirrg and
rnediating agent in interpersonal or intergror,rp relationshil-rs within a
defined territorv. Its organising and mediating role is wielded bv the
tlominant class depending on the prevailing socio-economic or political
system within the territory.
State failure rnust be conceptualised within the context of what the
state is. What this means is that the varions definitions of the state must
be included in the delineation of the constitnents of state failure.
Therefore, the divergence in the conceptualisation and definition of
state enriches, rather than impoverishes what state failure connotes.
Such divergences in oprinion yield broader understanding as they enable
the use of multiple tools to set tl-re boundaries of state failure. Thus,
whether state is conceptualised in the mould of Machiavellian/
Weberian framework which sees the state as existing to rnairrtain iaw
irrrd order and thus possesses a monopoly of the legitirnate ltse of force;
or Lockean/Rousseau/ Flobbesian social contract theory which situates
llrc basic objective of the state within the framework of volttntary
,rgreement amongst members of a territory to stirrender and cede some
ol.their freedorns and liberty to attain mutual security; or rnaterialist
:,tarrdpoint which conceives the state as existing to protect tl-re rnaterial
irrterest of the dominant class; or in the tradition o[ patriirrcl'ral or
rnatriarchal theories which view the state as a product of some form of
,rn cxtended family through the male or female line; or the evolutionary
llrt'ory which sees the state as naturallv evolvir-rg fror.n sinrple social
Iormations such as the family and bands into tht' eiarrt, complex
,r1;gregation of modern state system; or the legalistic corrt-eptttalisation
r'vlrich denotes the state as an entity with strch ch.rracteristics as
l,opttlation, territory and monopoly of forcerz, thc ftrrlc]atnental issr-re is
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not wl-rat the state is, bu I w,hether the state iras fLrlfilled its set or imposed
obliqatiolrs, which in contempor.lry c.ra cover domestic and
interi.raIional. In otl'rer words, t]r-e questions, wl-rich precede or ought to
prccecle thc ncltion of state failure ;rre: what has been happenirrg to the
fundarnerrtal objectives and directive principles of state policv? What is
the sta [e ol the econornic power of the people? Is the state still on top of
sccurity of lives and property? Is income distribution still within the
thresholcl of equity and fairness? Are governance and political
rc:presc.ntations reflecttve of the rvishes of the rnajority of thc people?
And, does the state possess the capacity and capabilitv to protect its
citizens domestically antj internationaI1v?
African statehood sufiers from two furrdamentr-rl flarvs which
underpin its contemporary dilemma. One is tl're natrtre of its formation.
African states suffer from arbitrary abstraction as their emergc.nce did
not involve the indigenous peoDles nor follow any svstem of aggregation
that recognised socio-cultural cleavages. Difierent peoples and
civilisations were banded together in a centrifugal union of opposites.
The inherent centrifugalisrn in lhe new states ensured the workabilitv
of tlre colcnial "divide and rulc" strategy as ethnic groups were pitched
against themselves in mutual suspicion and distrust. Two is the crisis
of post-independence dependency.,Af ter inderpendence, A frican states
continued on the path charted bv ihe colonialists instead of evolving a
new systcm based on new sets tlf norrns, values and visions. The
emergent African leaders -"\.ere content in merely replacing the
colonialists, forgetting or rather ignoring the fact that the exigencies of
the colonial states were ciictated by colonial interest. Thus, new Africa
maintained the olrl state structures with their imperfections and
incongruence to autonomolrs development trajectory. The implication
of this was that African states trr:came appendages of erstwhile colonial
rnasters instead of indepenclent entities and were" thus caught in the
neo-colonial.trap. The manifestation of this trap was the inability of
African countries to charrt a palh for independent development as they
were made to continue tri proCuce raw niaterials.r-r
The intricate linkage of Africain economies to the r:conomies of its
former coloniatrists rneai'rt that if tl-iey snr:ezed, tl're African economies
would catch coid. And they clid so in the 1970s when recession in
developed countries lecl to the iurplementation of anti-inflationary
policies that triggered rapid rise in the rarte of borrowing and lending.
T'he effect was the impiosion of r:conornic crisis in the African economies
that triggered balance of p;rvrnents problerns and crisis in its debt
holdings. At this pclint rvh.it confronted African states was the
nrilcl,()cc()rlomic chalienger c':rf making their debt burden sustainable. There
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\\'.ls lto question of state failr,rre thel-r. It \\'as not until 1992, several years
.rltr.r African economies had been sLrcked into the whirlwind of
1iIolri.rIisation through the IMF/World Bank neoliberal prescriptions
rvith promises of economic prosperitv that state failure or failed state
,,,rt.crcd the political lexicon. IJut at that initial time it was used to denote
w,rr-torn states or a state completely incapable of sustaining itself as a
rrrt.rnber of the international communitV.3r Since 2007, African countries
lr.rvc consistently constituted more than half of the countries categorised
,rs failed states.
The economic reform which the industrialised countries insisted
rr) (rst be impc.sed on African economies in order to keep up the liquiditv
.I't6c globil capitalist system and thus avert its collapse was also meant
l, prrt the economies oi th" Af.i.un states on the path of recovery and
tlt,vclopment. The implementation of these reforms has not materialised
irrttl prtsperitv as all indices of developme^t show seriotts weaknesses.
As ir matter of 
"fact, 
African developrnent st;tgnated and becarne fossilised'
I'hc survey conducted by UNICEF and UNDP on social spending in
A lrica before the turn of ihe ne* millennium revealed that only three
t.or.rntries in Africa were allocating 20 percent of budget funds for use
orr Lrasic healthcare, education and nutrition with over 44 percent of all
A lricans living on absolute poverty.35 The reason was that the capacity
t, generate thi needed resources had been eroded as Africa doled out
.',..'ir.*offi portion of its meagre resources for debt servicing' Africa's
tlt:bt stock rose twenty-four fold from its 1970 levels to a staggering
t ts$320 biliion in 1996and U5$350 billion in 1998. The portion of sub-
S,rharan Africa's clebt rose from US$236billio in 1996 to US$281'1 billion
rrr 2001 with debt servicing obligations put at us$23.7 biilion.36 Even
rvith debt forgiveness, Africa's entraPment at the periphery of the world
,rrrcl its role assignment at the agricultllral and natural resources
lrrodr-rction sector in contemporary globalisation undermine 
its
t lt'vclopment capacitY.
Ufhat sepa.ates the countries categorised as being under the danger
()l [ailure and those showcased as successfui is mainly their economic
lrcalth. AII the twelve criteria set out by the Lls Foreign Po/lcy mag,rzine
,rrrcl the US-based Fund for Peace Think Tank namely: mor"tt-rting
rl(lmographic pressures; massive movement of refugees and internally
,lisplaced peoples; legacy of vengeance-seeking grotlp gricvance;
r,ltronic and sust;rined human flight; uneven economic devclopment
,rlong; group lines; poverty and sharp or severe econtlmic decline;
t riurinalization and delegitirnisation of the state; Pro€iressive
rlt'tcrioration of public servi&s; widespread violation of lrttmal-r rights;
:,t,crrrity apparatlrs as "st;tte within a State"; rise of factionalised elites
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and intervention of other states or external actorsrT are inr'luenced bv
econonric f:rctors ;rnd other processes of globalisation. - r
Globalisation, Crisis of Development and New Chalrenges to AfricanDevelopment
The standard of living at the time of independence in almost alr
Af ricirn countries was far superior to contemporary standards. Up until
the 1970s, most African countries were considered "under-borrowed,,,
a conspiratorial criminalisation of the prudent and efficientmanagement of African economies. By this categorisation African
economies were inundated with both solicited and tinsoricited loans by
the IFIs. These loans rater led to debt peonage u"d h;it"d ;r,-e-m"arcr, orAfrican developmen,. g": oJ the conseq.,"-n.", of debt peonage wasthat.it effectively ended the prospects of autonomous African
development.
It is true that the capitalist penetratior-r of African economies created
some fundamental affinities between the African economies and that of
the colonising power3s, but that affinity was broke., at some fo^l *ni.nensured their derairment before maturation. That point oi d".uil*".,t
was marked by the debt entrapment. Thus, the impiementation of antr-inflationary policies; rapid rise in the rate of borrowing u.J or t".,a^g,
and, food crises in the 7970s,were the weapons used to actualise it. Todeepen the crisis and thus forecrose the achievement o[ economic
freedom, IMF evolved a plan of debt rescheduling that deernpnustea
the liquidation of theprincipar but strongly encouraged the payment ofinteres t. Throu gh deb t serv ici^g, r"r.hJJuling, ani ad d i til.,'ri iou.r,African countries were herded"into debt peonage and made to pay
several times over, the original sums they bor.o*"i. The IFIs, WTO andTNCs are veritable mechanisms of grobalrsation through which thecrisis in African economy were created, nurtured and entrenched. TheIMF was used to kick-start the process that entrapp"a poi".,tluffy
promising African economies and entrenched them ai tr," piripil.y orglobal capitalist system.
The I.{F reform package rocated the failure of African economies tomegi.its debt obligations on domestic market imperfections, economicinefficiencies, and social rigidities and therefore insisted on broadreforms to r9m9dy them. ihus, by 19g9,35 Sub_saharan African
countries had adopted SAp or its vaiiants to tackle balance of pavmentdeficits and facilitate the resumption of 
".ono*i.-g-rlrii'""adevelopment. Instructively, while the developed eco.,omies preached
openness and the ascendancy of market forces in African ectnomies,
thery closed their economies and raised protective walls aror-rnd them.
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;\lro, while they frowned at subsidies in African economies, thev
"rrlr5,iLli5g6 tl-reir farmers and operated all manner of w.elfare packlgtrs
l,r'11,"'. citizens. This double standard Jed M1,63ll to describe it as
l..t,ylr()s at home and Smith abroad.3e
(llobalisation operates within the logic of imperialism. The
,11'rr.rrrics of globalisation are essentiallytriven by the forces of
.r'.rrornic nationalism. The industrialised countries together with the
llls, tl're wro and the TNCs exert the strongest influence whereas
,lr,r,r'loping countries wield much less influence. Undoubtedly,
lll,lrlIisation is creating unprecedented opportunities for wealth
r rr',rlit)n and the betterrr.ent of human condition, but the African
r r p1'lignqs in the milieu of this prosperity is the prevalence of poverty.
Ir*tlrer words, the real story of globalisation is not its prosperity but
llr. lrtrge disproportionateness in its share between the developed and
,1,'vt'loping countries, especiaily Africa. For instance, despite
I l''\,('lopment efforts for more than half a cenLury, progress with respect
lr,,lt'velopment and poverty reduction remains Llneven and patchy.
h l,r.t' lhan 1.4 billion people in the developing world, representing about
'(' p1'1csnl of its population, still live below the international poverty
lrrrc of USg1.25 per person per day. While the world is recording
rr', lrrction in the incidence of poverty, the story is different in sub-
',, r I r,r nrn Africa. The number of poor in this region increased frorn 2r2
r r r r l l ion to 388 million during 1981-2005.'10 out of 50 countries categorised
,r,, k.irst developed countries (LDCs), Africa has 34 countries on the list.
I lrr. l.rm LDCs describes the" wretched" of the globe, the world,s poorest
r ,l rrtries indicated by low income (under US$750 gross national income
I 
t iN I I prer capita); human resource weakness in terms of nutrition, health,
'r lrt';rtion and adult literacy; and economic vulnerability based on the
n r( ll( .ltors of instability of agricultural production, export of goods and
,,r,rvit'cs, the economic importance of non-traditional activities,
rrrlrr lrandise export concentration, handicap of economic smallness;
,r rr I P1'rgsnfage of population displaced by natural disasters.al
'l'lrere are emerging forces in the dynamics of globalisation that
I {'r r( I I o deepen the challenges of African development. These are in the
,rrr,,r .l security, climate change and food crisis and migration. At the
',r'r rrrity level, globalisation has contributed to the intensification of
rr', rlr; ir.r Africa through the weak institutional control over the movement
,I ,,rrr,r ll arms and light weapons (SALWs). Out of between 500 and 650
rrrllrorr illicit weapons in circulation worldwide, an estimarted 100
rr rrllrrrr were in Africa with between eight - 10 million concentrated in
IIr. w.st African sub-region. As at2007, Africa accounted for 38 percent
r rl 1',lrlrirl armed confrontations. And, during the past 15 years, Africa
ltl
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hacl scltranrlt'red .rlurclst US 5300 billiorr on armecl corrilicts. Accordrrrg
to thc Srnall Anns Survev, militarv experrcliture rose bv -17 prcl6gnl dr"rring
the l99tls; wliiie life exprectancv declined frorn 50 vears to .16 years. On
the othcr hand, the developred conntries berrefited extensivelv as the
total arms sales of the world's 100 largest arms-prodncing comparries
incrcased by US$3+ billion in 2008 to reach US$385 billion.I Apart
f rom the loss of scarce resources, conflicts also led to the loss of humarr
resources to death and displacemcnt. In 2006, otrt of the global
population of 24 million internaily displacer-l persons (lDI's), resulting
from corrflicts, environment;rl and other natural disasters, over half or
13 rnillion were in Africa. The same trend contir-rued into 2009. L)ut of
the globai figure of 27.1million IDPs, the highest sir-rce 199'1,21 Afric;ur
countries accounted for 1 1.6 million IDPs.rs
The menace of climate change has also retarded the development
prospects of African nation. Because, the challenges of climate changc
are comPlsl and global as Iro country is immunc to its el'lecl.s,.rctions
against its fallouts have not demonstrated the tenets of globalisation.
The advanced countries have been lackadaisical in implementing the
Kyoto protocois that would help to roll back the negative affects of climate
change. The reason is simple: the action required against climate change
pitches them against the overall interest of the developed countries as it
would bring about substantial changes in the way technology is
deployed which ultimately could affect their prosperity. But because
the cost of managing the fallouts of climate change appears smaller
compared to its effects on Lhese advanced economies, action has been
sluggish. It is the developing world that bears the brunt most as droughts,
floods and forest fires interfere with their climate-sensitive natural
resources resulting in tragic crop failures, reduced agricultural
productivity and increased hunger, malnutrition and disease.+l
Clobalisation has shaped migration in many ways. The mix of
factors such as prosperity in the industrialised world, high life
expectancy, and the changes in its fertility and population growth rates
exert particularistic pressure on the economies of the developed countries.
The import of this pressure is that in the near future the developed
economies would lrave crisis in its labour formation. Their response to
th.is has been the lilreralisation of their immigration policies. Almost all
advanced countries have introduced a wide range of immigration
policies ranging from points-based systems in Australia, Canada and
the UK; H1-B visas in the US; Cerman Creen Card; the Etrropean BIue
('ard; the French Immigration "Choisie" as a strategy to supplement
Ihcir humarn resoLlrce needs. And Africa appears to be the feeder zone.
I'lrt' Al'rican Diaspora is estimated in 2009 to consist of over 30 million
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ih,illeci persons. It is clairned that migration is positive as it provides
rIportunity to banish poverty in poor collntries. As at 2009, Africans
ri ilre Diaspora remitted about US$40 billion to their home countries'
I Iro World 
-Bank 
projects that by 2025, migration could put over us$i40
rillion a year into the pockets of people in poor countries, which exceeds
lV illmost three times, the historic commitments of G8 leaders at
il|rrcagles in 2005 to double aid.rs This caiculation is one sided as it
,r ik'd tJ factor the cost of rnigration on Africa's prospects for econornic
l"rtrwth and development. Despite the ellormolls fii-lancial prospects
rv lrit'h rnigration holds, human resorlrccs and not capital are the major
ilriVt,r.s o] de.,elopment. In the new world order of globalisation,
r,t orrurnic growth and cievelopment are ciriven by people with
tr rr,,wlcdgel In practical terrirs, Africa is losing the vital technical
,." 1,t,rtise, entrepreneurial and rnat-ragerial skills necessary to 
rnotorise
rt,, rlt'velopmeni, and in exchange for their expertise gets a paltry and
, ,,nsqlatory fraction of their worth as rernittances' For instance, at about
1l:;l[150,00b yearly, it is calculated that African professionals who
rrrril,,rated tothe US contribute 40 times more wealth to the American
,,, ,,u,,,.y than to the African economy. No arrrount of financial capital
Lilr tran;late to clevelopment except iruntan knowledge is applied to it"
I lrt. lrLrth is that money carurot teach your children but teachers can;
nr()n(,y cannot bring electricity to your home, engineers can; money
, ,,,,,,,,I cure sick people, only doctors can. Because it is only a nation's
Irilrrrirn capital thit cin be converted into real wealth, human capital is
nrrrllr rnore valuable than its financial capital'46
('ortt'lusion
l'hc experience of Africa under globalisation is not any different
lrorrr that oi imperialism. Their dependency has deepened more than at
llrr.rr irrdependence. N1or,v, the| have lost the controi of policy making
,rrrr I tl(lpcnd on the developed countries, either as G8, OECD or the [FIs,
lr rr t lt.vclopment policies and trajectory as well as aid' And aid is not
rvlr,rt Al,rica n""dr but level-playing grourrd. NEPAD, w]'rich was
r,,,t,rblishecl to reap the gains of globalisation, appears to collude with it
Irr tlr'r'1-rening Africa's underdevelopment. One, it is anchored on
,,,', 1lil11'ral theory and thus sees issues from that theoretical prism' For
ttr,,l,ilr(.(,, NEPAb favours agricultural modernisation that is rlriven by
' I n l.,( u tlCrS rather than prOduCers; and, 
tlvO, it enviSageS the fr"trriling Of
tl', ,llvr'krptnental initiatirles to come from aid'
wl,ir t irre required to rnovet Afric;t trom the doldrunm o1'globalisation
ril+ lrrtlt,: thc reinterpretation of Africa's development trajectorywithrn
llrr,r'ontcxt of nitrltiplicity of alternatives; opening up and
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democr.rtisirtion the mr"rltilateral instiiutions; transparencv irr WTO
oper;rtiorrs .rnd jtrstice in in.rplementing WTO decisions. The currer-rt
problc:rl w'ith Africa's developrnent initiative is th;rt developmerrt
pararr('tcrs lrave for long been set by the aid donors, the G8 and IFIs.
Altcrnative development models as encapslllated in the 1980 Lagos
I)lan of Action and the 1989 Alternative Framework mtrst Lre seriously
consiclered by African leaders.
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